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1. Introduction 
 
The economic impact of military spending remains an enduring debate within the post Cold 
War environment. The end of the Cold War saw unprecedented reductions in military spending, 
admittedly from a spectacularly high base and a simple observation of the experience of most 
countries would suggest that this has not been at the expense of economic growth. Questions do still 
remain, however, as to what the likely impact of further reductions will be, or indeed the increases 
that seem to be in the pipeline. What is accepted generally is that the magnitude of military 
spending does not provide a measure of its overall importance to economies and there is concern 
that it may have particular effects within a number of areas. In particular its likely effect on 
technical progress is an issue of continuous discussion, as the recent paper by Kelly and Rishi 
(2003) shows. During the Cold War a major justification was the ‘spin off’ of innovations to the 
civil sector, such as computers, which could then be exploited profitably and to the benefit of the 
economy and society. There is evidence that this has changed in more recent times, with the speed 
of consumer industry led technological change leading to ‘spin in’ to advanced weapons systems. If 
this is the case it has removed a major benefit of military spending. There is, however, little 
systematic evidence and little recent empirical work. 
This paper makes a contribution to the debate, analysing the impact of military spending on 
technological progress, and hence labour productivity and economic growth, for a number of major 
weapons producers. It uses data on the manufacturing sector, for the period 1966-2002 and 
estimates a CES production function in which military spending is assumed to effect growth 
through its impact on trend technological change. The next section provides a brief review of the 
general issues and literature, section 3 presents the data sample and section 4 outlines the theoretical 
model used. The panel estimation methods used are then discussed in section 5, the results of the 




2. Economic Effects of Military Spending 
 
  2There is an extensive literature analysing the economic effects of military spending and a 
considerable range of results.
1 Theoretically, any evaluation of the impact of military spending on 
growth is contingent on the theoretical perspective used (Dunne, 1990). When statistical analysis is 
undertaken it is generally the neoclassical/Keynesian models that are used as these are most 
amenable to the creation of formal models, though some studies have adopted a more ad hoc 
approach. Studies also differ in terms of the country coverage, whether they use time series or cross 
section data, the time period covered and the empirical methods used. In general, the empirical 
analyses have identified a number of channels by which military spending can influence the 
economy and these can be positive or negative (Dunne, 1996).  
One argument is that military spending assists growth through promoting technological 
innovations that spill over to civil industries –there is a ‘spin off’ of innovations to civil companies. 
Technology developed by arms producers may have applications for non military production, non 
military production may benefit from the enhancement of capital stock to complete military orders 
and the growth of output of advanced military technologies may spur on technological change in 
suppliers in the civil sector. There is also a human capital dimension, by which military spending 
leads to improvements in education and training and so allows the upgrading of capital. All of these 
have potential downsides, however, as military spending may have a high opportunity cost, may 
create skill and capital bottlenecks, may misallocate resources away from growing sectors, and may 
create unsustainable enclaves. Whether military spending has a positive or negative effect is clearly 
an empirical question and the empirical literature has produced a range of studies and answers. 
Overall, the results seem to suggest that there is an insignificant or negative impact of military 
spending on economic growth in developing countries and a clearer negative impact in developed 
economies, through military spending being at the expense of investment rather than consumption. 
There is, however, considerable scope for further work focusing on particular aspects of the 
relationship and using country case studies, or relatively homogenous groups of countries (Smith, 
2000).  
 
In this study the focus is on the impact of military spending on the economy through its effect on 
technological progress and we choose to focus on the major arms producers.  
 
3. Data and Sample 
 
                                                           
1 Dunne et al (2005) provide a recent contribution, while Brauer (2002), Smith (2000), Dunne (1996) and Ram (1995) provide reviews. 
  3The principal concern in the selection of countries to include in this study is data 
comparability. The need for data consistency leads us to restrict our sample to countries in the 
OECD. This does, however, allow us to consider the main arms producers in North America and 
Western Europe.  Table 1 lists the countries included in the study and provides a statistical 
breakdown of the nature of the data used.
2 Our data spans from 1966 to 2002, which allows us to 
also investigate the existence of any Cold War effects. 
 














Greece 4.3  0.3 5.2 
France 4.0  4.6  3.8 
UK 1.6  5.9  4.4 
Italy 4.4  3.3  2.4 
Netherlands 3.1  0.9  2.8 
Canada 3.4  1.8 2 
Sweden 1.2  0.6  4.4 
Spain 4.3  2.1  2.6 
USA 2.8  17.7  5.7 
 
The manufacturing data used is mainly taken from the OECD Main Economic Indicators 
Dataset. However, we also use UNIDO and Penn World Tables. These sources are used to test for 
the robustness of our results and also to estimate figures for the limited cases of missing data. The 
military burden term, defined as military expenditure divided by Gross Domestic Product, is taken 
from SIPRI data. 
 
4. Theory and Method 
 
In analysing the employment effects of military spending, previous work has tended to take 
two approaches. One was to estimate a simple reduced form model to analyse the relationship (eg 
Dunne and Smith, 1980 for unemployment and military spending). A second is to specify a simple 
Cobb Douglas production, derive an employment function and then estimate, introducing a dynamic 
specification to the empirical model in some way, eg Dunne and Watson (2000). There are, 
however, problems with the Cobb Douglas production function as it implies the elasticity of 
                                                           
2Countries that had to be excluded in the study include Austria, Finland, Portugal and Sweden. The chief reason for this decision rested on 
the availability and completeness of manufacturing hours data, given we are interested in total hours of employment. 
  4substitution is unity and that technical progress is neutral. Some of these problems can be 
overcome, by using a CES production function as in Yildirim and Sezgin (2003) 
A further issue is how to introduce military spending into the model. There are two 
concerns, whether to use the level or burden measure and where to bring in the effect within the 
theoretical model. In the case of the former it is often dependent on the study, as the share is more 
satisfactory for cross country comparison and the level for individual country studies. For the latter 
the usual approach is to take the empirical aggregate labour demand function and then introduce 
military burden as an explanatory variable. 
Assuming that output follows a more general CES production function with labour 
augmenting technological progress: 
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where Q is output, K is the real capital stock, L is labour,ν is returns to scale, γ and s are 
production scale parameter, the elasticity of substitution is σ = 1 / (1+ρ) and technological progress 
is labour augmenting at rate λt . We measure labour as total employee hours, rather than the total 
number of employees.  
Following Barrell and Pain (1997), an expression for desired labour demand can then be 
derived via the first order condition that the marginal product of labour ( L Q δ δ ) is equal to the 
mark-up adjusted real hourly wage ( [ p w ] β ), where β  is assumed to be a constant. Taking natural 
logs yields: 
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The coefficient on the real wage provides an estimate of the elasticity of substitution, thus 
allowing technical progress and returns to scale to be identified. One means of introducing military 
spending into this model would be to simply add it to the employment demand equation as a 
separate independent variable. Previous studies using Cobb Douglas production functions (eg 
Dunne and Watson, 2000) and, more recently, Yildirim and Sezgin (2003) using a CES production 
function have done this. As our concern is to identify the impact of military spending on 
technological progress, we instead adapt Hubert and Pain’s (2001) approach to endogenising 
technical progress by adding military burden to the technological progress term: 
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This specification then assumes that technical progress will change at a constant rate if 
military expenditure also grows at a constant rate. The sign of  M λ  provides us with a means to 
investigate the impact, if any, that the military sector has on technological progress. A negative 
coefficient would be consistent with the hypothesis that the military sector is encumbering, as 
resources are diverted away from the civilian sector and towards military purposes. Alternatively, a 
positive coefficient would provide evidence of spin-off effects, where military innovation is adapted 
for the civilian sector.  
It is of course possible for military spending to have other impacts on technological progress 
as any increase in the use of specific technologies can increase profits from innovation and 
therefore increase R&D incentives. 
The empirical specification used allows for adjustment lags in employment and output to 
provide a dynamic model with the technical progress (and thus military spending) embedded in the 
long run steady state solution: 
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As Hubert and Pain (2001) note, this specification avoids the strong assumption that firms 
are able to always produce their output with the minimum necessary level of inputs. A useful 
property if one considers the nature of defence companies. This gives an estimable equation of the 
form 
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5. Estimation Methods 
 
A major problem with time series analyses of the economic effect of military expenditure 
has been the relatively small amount of variation in the data over time. It is simply difficult to 
identify any particular effect of military spending, given the other changes that are taking place. The 
size of the cuts in military spending that followed the end of the Cold War has improved the 
situation for researchers. At the same time the development of panel data methods, which pool cross 
section and time series data, have also assisted in overcoming the lack of independent exogenous 
variation in the data, especially when used for a relatively homogenous group of countries 
(Murdoch et al., 1997). There is a variety of approaches, with pooling the simplest form and fixed 
  6effect, random effect and random coefficient estimators providing more flexible approaches. The 
most common panel estimator is the one way fixed effects or ‘between’ estimator. This allows the 
intercept to differ across countries and is equivalent taking deviations from the mean of each group 
for the whole time period for each observation and then using these deviations in the regression. 
Taking deviations in this way means that only the within group variation is considered and the 
information in the between group cross sectional relation is ignored.
3  
With the relatively long time series available it has become possible to introduce dynamics 
to the panel data models.  In dynamic models of the form: 
 
yjt = αj + β xjt + λ xjt-1 + ujt     
 
the fixed effect estimator is not consistent as N, the number of groups, goes to infinity for fixed T 
because of lagged dependent variable bias, which biases λ  downwards. It is, however, consistent as 
T goes to infinity. For samples where T is large, as it is here, the bias is small and so the method is 
used in practice. If the parameters differ over the groups, however, giving models of the form: 
 
yjt = αj + βj xjt + λj xjt-1 + ejt     
 
there is a further heterogeneity bias, as the error in the fixed effects equation is: 
 
ujt = ejt + (βj - β) xjt + (λj - λ) yjt-1    
 
which is correlated with the regressors. In the usual case where xjt is positively serially 
correlated, this will bias the estimate of λ upwards towards unity. The bias will be smaller in the 
long run effect β/(1-λ) because the estimate of β is biased downwards and the estimate of λ biased 
upwards and can be avoided when T is large by estimating each equation individually and then 
taking the weighted or unweighted average of the individual estimates. A common weighted 
average is the random coefficient model (RCM) estimator discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
 
6. Results  
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the fixed effects panel model. This was estimated 
for the full sample and for the Cold War period, to investigate the impact of the change in strategic 
                                                           
3 The pooled OLS method simply estimates a model on all of the data, implicitly assuming that all parameters are the same for each 
country. This gives both types of information, within and between, equal weight. It is also possible to allow for time fixed effects 
separately or together in a two way fixed effect model, which gives a completely flexible trend common to all countries. A random 
effects model allows for the intercepts to be random, drawn from some probability distribution with a finite number of parameters. 
This gives an estimator that is between the pooled and fixed effects models, but we do not use it here (Smith and Dunne, 2002). 
  7environment and military expenditure levels since the end of the Cold War. In the first and third 
columns we report a conventional labour demand specification that includes only a deterministic 
time trend to indicate technical change. The coefficients are consistent with expectations. There is a 
positive effect of growth of output on the growth of employment, a negative effect of level of 
employment, a positive effect of the level of output, a negative real wage effect and a negative 
coefficient on the time trend. However, the estimated elasticities of substitution are low, particularly 
for the Cold War restricted results. 
The endogenising of technical progress with the inclusion of our military term produces 
some interesting results, as shown in columns (2) and (4) of table 2 . Using our full sample we find 
no evidence of any significant impact of the military sector. The coefficient sign does suggest that 
there may be some impact of military spending on the efficiency in use of labour, through its impact 
on technology. This finding is more apparent when our data is restricted to the Cold War period 
where the coefficient is now found to be larger and significant. The military sector during this 
period is more important, with countries on average bearing higher military burdens. Our results 
suggest that a 10% rise in the military burden will eventually raise technical progress by 0.5%. We 
therefore find some support for the ‘spin off’ effect, but this effect is found to be rather small. 
 
Table 2: Panel Results: Fixed Effects [dependent variable=   ) log( it L ∆ ] 
  1966-2002 1966-1989 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
) log( it Q ∆   0.8844* 0.2132* 1.0930* 1.0492* 
) log( 1 , − t i L   -0.4235* -0.4198* -0.7070* -0.7587* 
) log( 1 , − t i Q   0.3382* 0.3321* 0.8656* 0.9345* 
) log( 1 , 1 , − − t i t i P W
 
-0.0735** -0.0689** -0.1176** -0.1729** 
TIME  -0.011* -0.011* -0.0295*  -0.0300* 
) log( 1 , − t i M    -0.0016   0.0199** 
(**) significant at 10%; (*) significant at 1% 
To consider the possibility of heterogeneity bias, we now consider the mean group estimator 
technique. Individual country results, results of which are provided in the Appendix, present us with 
the results summarised in Table 3.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
  8The coefficients are again as we would expect, with the estimates providing a conventional 
labour demand relationship. The elasticity of substitution is estimated to be 0.464 and there is some 
evidence of increasing returns to scale. Our military term again suggests weak evidence of an 
impact of military spending on technical progress. This effect, however, is very small. The 
coefficient is insignificant and our estimates again only imply a 10% rise in the military burden will 
eventually raise technical progress by 0.5%. 
 
Table 3:   Mean Group Estimator Results 
 
  Mean t  stat  Min  Max  Sd  Cov 
 
) log( it Q ∆   0.445  4.49  0.14  0.80 0.23 0.51 
 
) log( 1 , − t i L   -0.450 -12.2  -0.57  -0.35  0.08  -0.19 
 
) log( 1 , − t i Q   0.369  8.66  0.22  0.51 0.10 0.26 
 
) log( 1 , 1 , − − t i t i P W   -0.209 -5.25  -0.38  -0.11  0.09  -0.44 
 
TIME  -0.006  -3.24  -0.01  0.004 0.004 -0.71 
 
Constant  1.151  0.58  -5.13  8.79 4.58 3.98 
 




This paper has considered the economic impact of military spending through its impact on 
technical progress, using a standard labour demand specification. It thus proved an evaluation of the 
commonly cited ‘spin-off’ hypothesis. The results presented focussed on the benefits of panel data 
techniques to avoid problems of insufficient variation in the data over time.  They indicated that 
there have been some minor benefits from the military sector in terms of higher technical progress, 
but that this effect was marginal. Estimating the model over the Cold War period, gave somewhat 
stronger effects as might be expected. This provides support for the idea that, with the development 
of modern weaponry, the impact of the military sector has declined, with ‘spin-in’ of civil 
technologies rather than ‘spin-off’ taking place and so military R&D being increasingly concerned 
with finding military purposes for civilian know-how. 
These are interesting results, but more work is required to test the robustness of our results. 
In particular, more focus on collecting consistent and detailed military research and development 
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 US  UK  France 
  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
) log( t Q ∆   0.797 8.270 0.650 6.250 0.138 1.473 
) log( 1 − t L   -0.413 -1.670 -0.561 5.917 -0.568 5.066 
) log( 1 − t Q   0.365 2.152 0.479 4.912 0.369 4.967 
) log( 1 1 − − t t P W   -0.214 2.443 -0.379 4.627 -0.187 3.009 
TIME -0.007  -1.935  -0.008 2.356  -0.010 3.190 
Constant  -5.131  -1.851 5.020 2.023 8.785 4.165 
) log( 1 − t M   0.082 2.178 -0.137 3.008 -0.172 5.089 
2 R   0.823 0.776 0.604 
Sargan Chi(5)=12.410  Chi(5)=11.385  Chi(3)=8.757 
LM Chi(1)=6.625  Chi(1)=0.005  Chi(1)=0.509 
NORM Chi(2)=0.786  Chi(2)=1.135  Chi(2)=0.857 
Het Chi(1)=0.227  Chi(1)=6.810  Chi(1)=0.355 
V  1.321 1.828 2.095 
σ   0.517 0.675 0.329 
m λ   -0.199 0.245 0.303 
 Italy  Canada  Greece 
 Coeff  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat 
) log( t Q ∆   0.331 2.679 0.569 8.994 0.239 1.779 
) log( 1 − t L   -0.433 3.392 -0.484 -3.032 -0.350 3.468 
) log( 1 − t Q   0.272 3.005 0.457 4.350 0.344 3.780 
) log( 1 1 − − t t P W   -0.108 2.901 -0.238 -3.221 -0.171 2.617 
TIME -0.004  2.663  -0.008 3.677  -0.006 3.478 
Constant 2.606  0.824  -2.143 -1.142 -0.433 0.336 
) log( 1 − t M   0.029 1.072 0.054 1.836  -0.008 0.206 
2 R   0.459 0.766 0.493 
Sargan Chi(4)=9.016  Chi(5)=10.914  Chi(1)=5.804 
LM Chi(1)=0.124  Chi(1)=0.385  Chi(1)=2.165 
NORM Chi(2)=6.878  Chi(2)=2.391  Chi(2)=1.199 
Het Chi(1)=1.062  Chi(1)=0.001  Chi(1)=0.186 
V 1.985  1.123  1.037 
σ   0.249 0.492 0.488 
m λ   -0.068 -0.111 0.023 
 
 Spain  Netherlands  Sweden 
 Coeff  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat 
) log( t Q ∆   0.503 4.314 0.200 1.758 0.582 5.067 
) log( 1 − t L   -0.359 2.627 -0.369 2.857 -0.510 3.885 
  11) log( 1 − t Q   0.217 1.690 0.309 3.886 0.509 4.655 
) log( 1 1 − − t t P W   -0.125 2.679 -0.139 2.645 -0.323 2.421 
TIME 0.004  0.633  -0.005 1.774  -0.008 -2.081
Constant 3.340  2.023  -4.506 1.132  2.820  0.729 
) log( 1 − t M   -0.012 -2.679 0.183  2.278 -0.140 -1.683
2 R   0.557 0.467 0.623 
Sargan Chi(1)=2.882  Chi(4)=8.084  Chi(3)=6.54 
LM Chi(1)=2.085  Chi(1)=0.001  Chi(1)=3.331 
NORM Chi(2)=24.22  Chi(2)-2.667  Chi(2)=1.556 
Het Chi(1)=0.399  Chi(1)=0.804  Chi(1)=0.207 
V 2.544  1.350  1.007 
σ   0.349 0.376 0.633 
m λ   0.034 -0.498 0.274 
 
  12